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Preventing the Erosion of Sixth Amendment
Protections: Defining the Jury's Role under
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
United States v. Booker
DUE PROCESS - SIXTH AMENDMENT - RIGHT TO A JURY TRIAL APPRENDI: The Supreme Court held that, as originally written,
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines required judges to impose enhanced sentences based on judicial fact-finding that exceeded the
statutory maximum supported by a jury verdict in violation of the
criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment rights. The Supreme
Court applied a remedy that made the Federal Sentencing Guidelines advisory rather than mandatory.
United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005).
At Freddie Booker's trial, the Government presented evidence
that he was carrying 92.5 grams of crack in his duffel bag at the
time of his arrest.1 Based on this evidence, the jury found beyond
a reasonable doubt that Booker was guilty of possessing a controlled substance with intent to distribute at least fifty grams of
crack.2 The Federal Sentencing Guidelines3 (hereinafter "Sentencing Guidelines") required the judge to choose a sentence within
the range of seventeen years and six months and twenty-one years
and ten months.'
Later, the judge considered additional evidence at Booker's posttrial sentencing proceeding.5 The judge found by a preponderance
of the evidence that Booker was guilty of possessing a significantly

1. United States v. Booker, 125 S. Ct. 738, 746 (2005).
2. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746. Booker was convicted of violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
Id. This statute is part of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq.
(1999).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (2000). Sentencing guidelines are "[a] set of standards for determining the punishment that a convicted criminal should receive, based on the nature of the
crime and the offender's criminal history." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1098 (Abridged 7th
ed. 2000).
4. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746. The facts that were used to determine Booker's sentencing range under the Sentencing Guidelines included his criminal history and the amount of
drugs involved in his conviction. Id.
5. Id.
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larger quantity of crack.6 In addition, the judge concluded that
Booker was guilty of obstructing justice.7 Based on these findings,
the judge was bound by the Sentencing Guidelines to impose an
enhanced sentence within the range of thirty years to life imprisonment.8 The judge sentenced Booker to thirty years in prison.9
Booker appealed the imposition of his enhanced sentence to the
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit." Relying on earlier Supreme Court decisions, the Seventh Circuit held that the district
court's application of the Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth
Amendment. 1 The Government appealed the Seventh Circuit's
decision by petitioning the United States Supreme Court for a writ
of certiorari. 2
In a separate jury trial, Ducan Fanfan was found guilty of conspiracy to distribute and possession with intent to distribute at
least five hundred grams of cocaine.13 According to the Sentencing
Guidelines, the maximum sentence that Fanfan could receive
based on this conviction was six years and six months. 4 The judge
made additional findings supported by a preponderance of the evi6. Id. Specifically, the judge determined that Booker was in possession of an additional 566 grams of crack. Id. Preponderance of the evidence is a standard that refers to
"superior evidentiary weight that, though not sufficient to free the mind wholly from all
reasonable doubt, is still sufficient to incline a fair and impartial mind to one side of the
issue rather than the other." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 962 (Abridged 7th ed. 2000).
7. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746. Obstruction of justice refers to "[i]nterference with the
orderly administration of law and justice, as by giving false information to or withholding
evidence from a police officer or prosecutor, or by harming or intimidating a witness or
juror." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 882 (Abridged 7th ed. 2000).
8. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 746-47.
11. Id. at 747. Specifically, the Seventh Circuit determined that the application of the
Sentencing Guidelines to enhance Booker's sentence was in conflict with the Supreme
Court's holding in Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 746.
In Apprendi, the Supreme Court held that "other than the fact of a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must
be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt." Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
The Seventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Court's holding in Blakely to determine the
definition of statutory maximum. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 747. The Court concluded in
Blakely that for Apprendi purposes, statutory maximum refers to the maximum sentence
that a judge may impose "solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or
admitted by the defendant." Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303.
12. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 747. Certiorari is "[an extraordinary writ issued by an appellate court, at its discretion, directing a lower court to deliver the record in the case for review. The U.S. Supreme Court uses certiorari to review most of the cases that it decides to
hear." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 179 (Abridged 7th ed. 2000).
13. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 747. The jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that Fanfan
was guilty of violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(B)(ii). Id. These statutes
are part of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. 21 U.S.C. § 801 et seq. (1999)
14. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 747.
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dence at Fanfan's sentencing hearing. 5 Based on these findings,
the judge, under the Sentencing Guidelines, was authorized to
increase Fanfan's sentence to at least fifteen years and eight
months and no more than nineteen years and seven months. 6
Concerned with the possible implication of the Sixth Amendment,
the judge limited Fanfan's sentence to one that was supported by
the jury's verdict rather than an enhanced sentence based on his
findings." When the Government's motion to correct Fanfan's
sentence was denied, it appealed to the Court of Appeals for the
First Circuit.
The Government also petitioned the Supreme
Court for a writ of certiorari before judgment by the First Circuit. 9
Both of the Government's petitions regarding the sentencing of
Booker and Fanfan were granted and consolidated by the Supreme Court in order to determine whether a criminal defendant's
Sixth Amendment rights are violated by a judge's application of
the Sentencing Guidelines to enhance a sentence beyond the
statutory maximum supported either by a jury verdict or by the
defendant's admission. ° The Government also requested that the
Court determine an appropriate remedy, if necessary.2 1
The Court's decision contains two opinions written by Justice
Stevens and Justice Breyer, respectively.22 Justice Stevens wrote
for the majority in a 5-4 decision supporting the Seventh Circuit's
holding that the district court's application of the Sentencing
15. Id. The additional findings made at the sentencing hearing included that Fanfan
was responsible for 2.5 kilograms of cocaine powder and 261.6 grams of crack. Id. It was
also determined that he was the organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor of criminal activity. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id. The judge's concern stemmed from the Supreme Court's recent decision in
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). In Blakely, the Court held that the application
of Washington's sentencing guidelines to increase a defendant's sentence beyond the statutory maximum for the charged offense was a violation of his Sixth Amendment rights.
Blakely, 542 U.S. at 305. The Sixth Amendment reads as follows:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime
shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to
be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his
defense.
U.S. CONST.

amend. VI.

18. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 747. The First Circuit did not hear this appeal because the
Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari before judgment. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 748.
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Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment.23 In response to this
holding, Justice Breyer wrote the second opinion for a 5-4 majority
explaining the remedy applied by the Court.24
Justice Stevens began Part II of the Court's four part opinion by
emphasizing that the Constitution guarantees criminal defendants certain protections under the Sixth Amendment.25 Justice
Stevens noted that any analysis and interpretation of modern
criminal statutes and sentencing procedures involves ensuring
that these constitutional protections are maintained. 26 Referring
to a series of cases involving the interpretation and application of
sentencing enhancement statutes and state sentencing guidelines,
the Court stated the current jurisprudence for this area.27 Relying
on a principle first articulated by the majority in Jones v. United
States"s and later adopted by the majority in Apprendi v. New Jersey,2" the majority reaffirmed Apprendi's holding that a criminal
defendant's Sixth Amendment rights are violated when his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum for that crime." The Court
23. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 747-48. Justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg joined
in Justice Stevens' majority opinion. Id. at 746. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy joined Justice Breyer in dissent of the majority's opinion. Id. at 803
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 756 (majority opinion). Justice Breyer was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Ginsburg in his majority opinion regarding the remedy to be applied. Id. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter and Justice Scalia, in part,
authored a dissent of Justice Breyer's majority opinion. Id. at 771 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
In addition, Justices Scalia and Thomas wrote separate dissents of the majority's opinion.
Id. at 789 (Scalia, J., dissenting), 795 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
25. Id. at 748 (majority opinion). Part I of the opinion provided the factual background
and procedural history for Booker's and Fanfan's cases. Id. at 746-47. Justice Stevens
emphasized in the opening paragraph of Part II the importance of the beyond a reasonable
doubt standard and the requirement that a jury find the defendant guilty of all elements of
the crime charged. Id. at 748.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 748-49. Justice Stevens reiterated the key holdings that the Court relied on
in its determination of the issue presented in this case. Id. See generally Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004) (holding Washington's mandatory sentencing scheme implicated Sixth Amendment protections for criminal defendants); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584
(2002) (holding that Apprendi standards apply in cases that involve the determination of
aggravating factors that could lead to the imposition of the death penalty); Apprendi v.
New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (holding that other than fact of prior conviction, any fact
that increases penalty beyond prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to the
jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt); and Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227
(1999) (opining in dictum that its decision regarding the determination of a fact as an element of a crime was consistent with a practice that requires juries to determine facts that
"raise a sentencing ceiling" in state and federal sentencing guidelines).
28. 526 U.S. 227, 243 n.6 (1999).
29. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
30. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 748. A judge's finding regarding any prior convictions of the
defendant is an exception to this rule. Id.
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also reaffirmed its holding in Blakely v. Washington3 1 that "statutory maximum" refers to the maximum sentence supported by the
jury's findings beyond a reasonable doubt.32
In order to determine if the Sentencing Guidelines are subject to
this Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, Justice Stevens considered
whether the Sentencing Guidelines are discretionary or mandatory.33 The Court noted that the Sixth Amendment would not apply to the Sentencing Guidelines if judges were permitted to exercise discretion when using them.34 Justice Stevens stated that
when a judge has the discretion to choose a sentence within an
established statutory range, he is constitutionally permitted to
consider additional facts relevant to selecting the appropriate sentence. 5 The majority concluded that, as written, the Sentencing
Guidelines are mandatory because judges are required to follow
their provisions.3 6 In addition, the Court relied on its earlier decision in Mistretta v. United States,3 7 recognizing that the Sentencing Guidelines are mandatory and the courts are bound by them.3"
Finally, Justice Stevens used the facts in Booker to demonstrate
how the Sentencing Guidelines are mandatory.3 9
In Part III of the majority's opinion, Justice Stevens considered
three arguments raised by the Government.4 ° In response to the
Government's attempt to distinguish this case from Blakely, the
Court held that it was of no significance that the Sentencing
Guidelines are a product of an independent commission rather

31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

542 U.S. 296, 303 (2004).
Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 749.
Id. at 750.
Id.
Id.
Id. Justice Stevens relied on the language of the statute, stating,
While subsection (a) of § 3553 of the sentencing statute lists the Sentencing
Guidelines as one factor to be considered in imposing a sentence, subsection (b)
directs that the court "shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the
range" established by the Guidelines, subject to departures in specific, limited
cases.
Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553 (1984 & Supp. 2004)).
37. 488 U.S. 361, 367 (1989).
38. Booker, 125 S.Ct. at 750 n.2.
39. Id. at 751. Justice Stevens referred to the trial judge's imposition of a sentence that
was practically ten years longer than the one required by the Sentencing Guidelines based
on the jury verdict. Id. He also emphasized that if the trial judge chose not to enhance the
sentence, he would likely have been reversed on appeal because of the limited discretion
permitted by the Sentencing Guidelines. Id.
40. Id. at 752.
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than the legislature. 41 Next, the Court addressed the Government's argument that stare decisis prevents the Court from applying the Sixth Amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines."42 Justice
Stevens stated that stare decisis does not apply because the earlier decisions referenced by the Government did not involve the
same issues. 43 Finally, the majority declared that the Government's separation of powers argument was without merit.4 According to the Court, this holding will not require the Sentencing
Commission to perform any legislative functions. 5 Justice Stevens noted that the Sentencing Commission will continue to have
the same authority to perform the duties delegated to it by Congress.46 In addition, Justice Stevens emphasized that this holding
was not meant to alter any of the Court's earlier decisions regarding the constitutionality of the authority delegated to the Sentencing Commission.
Justice Stevens stated the majority's conclusions in Part IV of
the opinion. 4' The majority held that the mandatory nature of the
Sentencing Guidelines implicated the Sixth Amendment's protec-

41. Id. Justice Stevens further emphasized the constitutional insignificance of who
created the Sentencing Guidelines by quoting the majority from Blakely,
[T]he Framers would not have thought it too much to demand that, before depriving a man of [ten] more years of his liberty, the State should suffer the
modest inconvenience of submitting its accusation to "the unanimous suffrage
of twelve of his equals and neighbours," rather than a lone employee of the
State.
Id. (quoting Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 313-14 (2004)).
42. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 753. Stare decisis refers to "[t]he doctrine of precedent, under
which it is necessary for a court to follow earlier judicial decisions when the same points
arise again in litigation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1137 (Abridged 7th ed. 2000).
43. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 754. The majority briefly discussed the issues involved with
the earlier cases that the Government relied on in raising this argument. Id. at 753-54.
Justice Stevens noted that while these earlier cases raised issues regarding sentencing
enhancement and the application of the Sentencing Guidelines, none of them addressed the
issue of enhancing sentences beyond the statutory maximum supported by the jury verdict.
Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. The Government argued that subjecting the Sentencing Guidelines to jury
requirements would transform them from sentencing factors into "a code defining elements
of criminal offenses." Id.
46. Id. Justice Stevens reiterated the Court's holding from Mistretta that "rather than
performing adjudicatory functions, instead [the Sentencing Commission] makes political
and substantive decisions" related to the identification of facts relevant to sentencing and
the impact of those facts on sentencing. Id. at 754-55 (citing Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 393 (1989)).
47. Id. at 755.
48. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 756.
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tion of criminal defendants.49 The Court concluded that the application of the Sentencing Guidelines violated the Sixth Amendment
when it required sentencing judges to enhance sentences beyond
the statutory maximum supported by a jury's verdict."
In his dissent to Justice Stevens' majority opinion, Justice
Breyer stated several reasons why he did not agree with the majority's application of Apprendi's and Blakely's Sixth Amendment
requirement to the Sentencing Guidelines.5 ' He began his argument by noting that the Sixth Amendment cannot be read to prevent judges from determining facts associated with sentencing.52
Justice Breyer elaborated on this interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment by distinguishing between factual elements associated with the crime and sentencing factors associated with the
offender and the way he conducted the crime.53 From a historical
perspective, Justice Breyer argued that the right to a jury trial
was limited to determining the truth of the elements of the crime,
not the sentencing factors. " He also noted that the determination
of sentencing factors was traditionally left to the judge."
Next, Justice Breyer emphasized that the Sentencing Guidelines address essential facts regarding sentencing that are used by
a judge in determining the appropriate punishment for a convicted
criminal. 6 He argued that Congress did not intend for these factors to be used in determining the guilt of the defendant. In Justice Breyer's opinion, the application of the Sixth Amendment requirement to the mandatory Sentencing Guidelines would be detrimental to maintaining a fair criminal process." Justice Breyer
also raised the argument that Justice Stevens' majority holding
49. Id. The majority determined that the Court's holding in Blakely was applicable to
the Sentencing Guidelines. Id.
50. Id. The Court affirmed its decision from Apprendi. Id.
51. Id. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer was joined in his dissent by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor and Kennedy. Id.
52. Id.
53. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 803 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer referred to the
majority's argument that the "right of 'trial by jury has been understood to require' a jury
trial for the determination of the 'truth of every accusation." Id. (quoting majority opinion
of Stevens, J., at 753) (emphasis removed). He noted that this issue is dependent on
whether accusation is meant to include sentencing facts. Id. (Breyer, J., dissenting).
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 804.
57. Id.
58. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 804 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer wrote that the
majority's decision places a heavy burden on Congress' efforts to ensure uniform treatment
of like offenders. Id.
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interferes with the legislature's power to establish sentencing factors as distinguished from elements that define the crime.59 At the
conclusion of his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer stressed that
the holdings of Apprendi and Blakely should not be applied to the
Sentencing Guidelines because they are administrative guidelines
created by the Sentencing Commission acting as an independent
agency and not statutes created by Congress."
The next component of the Court's opinion was Justice Breyer's
majority opinion setting forth and explaining the remedy to be
applied.61 In Part I of its five part opinion, the majority considered
the legislative intent of the Sentencing Reform Act and concluded
that the intent behind the creation of the sentencing guidelines
was to increase the imposition of uniform sentences.6 2 In addition,
the Court emphasized that Congress intended judicial fact-finding
to be a key factor in achieving this goal.' The majority held that
the remedy most consistent with Congress' intent would be to
sever those provisions within the Sentencing Guidelines that
Justice Breyer stated that Congress
make them mandatory.'
would prefer to alter the Sentencing Guidelines rather than invalidate them or subject them to the Sixth Amendment requirements. 5
In Part II of the majority's opinion, Justice Breyer explained
why imposing the jury requirement on the Sentencing Guidelines
would be inappropriate. 66 Relying on the text of the statute, the
Court held that Congress intended the judge, not the jury, to be
the fact-finder regarding sentencing factors.67 Justice Breyer em-

59. Id. Justice Breyer argued that there is constitutional significance in Congress'
freedom to label a fact as a sentencing element rather than a criminal element. Id.
60. Id. at 805-06. Justice Breyer argued that the Sentencing Guidelines do not need to
be treated the same as the statutes involved in Apprendi and Blakely because the Sentencing Commission that establishes the Sentencing Guidelines does not have the power to
create elements of a crime that "bind or regulate the primary conduct of the public.'" Id. at
806 (quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 396 (1989)).
61. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 757 (majority opinion).
62. Id. See 18 U.S.C. § 3551 (2000) (authorizing the creation of the Sentencing Commission, an independent agency designated with the power to promulgate the Sentencing
Guidelines).
63. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 757.
64. Id. at 758.
65. Id. at 758-59.
66. Id. at 759. This was the remedy suggested by Justice Stevens in his dissent. Id.
67. Id. Justice Breyer referred to specific language within the statute, stating, "the
statute's text states that 'the court' when sentencing will consider 'the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteristics of the defendant.'" Id. (quoting 18
U.S.C. § 3553(a)(1) (1984 & Supp. 2004)). Justice Breyer interpreted "the court" to mean
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phasized that Congress' goal was for judges to use the Sentencing
Guidelines to impose uniform sentences based on the defendant's
conduct during the commission of the crime.6 The majority noted
that judges often rely on information related to the defendant's
conduct in pre-sentencing reports that are normally not available
until after the trial.6 9 Justice Breyer argued that applying the
Court's jury requirement to the sentencing procedures would limit
the judge's ability to rely on the pre-sentencing report for information related to sentencing.7 °
The Court further argued that imposing the majority's Sixth
Amendment jury requirement would result in a more complicated
sentencing process.71 In its analysis of this alternative remedy,
the Court included a brief discussion regarding the negative impact of plea bargaining on sentence uniformity."2 Justice Breyer
noted that Congress would not have implemented a sentencing
system that limited a judge's ability to increase sentences.7 3 Based
on this analysis, the majority concluded that Congress would not
have created a system that required a jury to determine the presence of sentencing factors related to the character and conduct of
the defendant.74
In Part III of his opinion, Justice Breyer identified which provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines should be severed.75 Utilizing
the rules of severability analysis, the majority concluded that it
was necessary to excise two provisions of the Sentencing Guide-

"the judge

without the jury," not 'the judge working together with the jury." Booker, 125 S.
Ct. at 759.
68. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 759.
69. Id. at 760.
70. Id. Justice Breyer provided examples to demonstrate how this practice would have
a negative impact on the imposition of uniform sentences based on the real conduct of the
defendants. Id. at 761-62.
71. Id. at 761-62. This argument focused on the complications associated with how to
include real conduct in the charges against the defendant. Id. at 761. In addition, Justice
Breyer argued that this requirement would make it more difficult for defendants to raise
adequate defenses and juries to perform their duties. Id. at 762.
72. Id. at 763. Justice Breyer argued that without the judge's ability to base sentences
on pre-sentencing facts presented after trial, plea bargaining would result in sentences
based on the skill of the defendant's lawyer rather than the real conduct of the defendant.

Id.
73. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 763. Referring to the amicus brief written by several United
States Senators, Justice Breyer emphasized that it was not the intent of Congress to limit
the ability of the judge to enhance a sentence when warranted. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id.
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lines."6 The Court held that eliminating these provisions made the
Sentencing Guidelines advisory, rather than mandatory.77 As a
result, judges may consider additional facts relevant to sentencing
without implicating the Sixth Amendment. 8 Justice Breyer emphasized that even though the Sentencing Guidelines are no
longer mandatory, judges are still required to consult them when
imposing sentences.79
76. Id. at 764. Severability analysis involves retaining those provisions of the Sentencing Guidelines that are valid under the Constitution, those that function independently,
and those that are consistent with the basic objectives of Congress. Id. The mandatory
provision to be severed reads in relevant part:
Application of guidelines in imposing a sentence ... [tihe court shall impose a
sentence of the kind, and within the range, referred to in subsection (a)(4)
unless the court finds that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by the
Sentencing Commission in formulating the guidelines that should result in a
sentence different from that described.
Id. at 770 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (Supp. 2004)) (emphasis added). The provision
relating to the standard of review used in appeals reads as follows:
Consideration. Upon review of the record, the court of appeals shall determine
whether the sentence - (1) was imposed in violation of law; (2) was imposed as
a result of an incorrect application of the sentencing guidelines; (3) is outside
the applicable guideline range, and (A) the district court failed to provide the
written statement of reasons required by section 3553(c); (B) the sentence departs from the applicable guideline range based on a factor that - (i) does not
advance the objectives set forth in section 3553(a)(2); or (ii) is not authorized
under section 3553(b); or (iii) is not justified by the facts of the case; or (C) the
sentence departs to an unreasonable degree from the applicable guidelines
range, having regard for the factors to be considered in imposing a sentence, as
set forth in section 3553(a) of this title and the reasons for the imposition of the
particular sentence, as stated by the district court pursuant to the provisions of
section 3553(c); or (4) was imposed for an offense for which there is no applicable sentencing guideline and is plainly unreasonable.
The Court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity of the district
court to judge the credibility of the witnesses, and shall accept the findings of
fact of the district court unless they are clearly erroneous and, except with respect to determinations under subsection (3)(A) or (3)(B), shall give due deference to the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts. With respect to ... (3)(A) or (3)(B), the court of appeals shall review de novo the district court's application of the guidelines to the facts.
Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 771 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) (main ed. and Supp. 2004)).
77. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 764. Section 3553(b)(1) was severed because it had the effect
of making the Sentencing Guidelines mandatory. Id. Section 3742(e) was severed because
it ensured judicial conformity to the Sentencing Guidelines through the standard of review
used for federal sentencing appeals. Id. at 765. Justice Breyer stated that excising this
appeals provision does not "pose a critical problem for the handling of appeals ... because.
. . a statute that does not explicitly set forth a standard of review may nonetheless do so
implicitly." Id. He argued that the provisions that remain in effect imply an unreasonableness standard of review, rather than a de novo review. Id.
78. Id. at 766.
79. Id. at 767. Justice Breyer was referring to Section 3553(a)(4) which reads in relevant part as follows: "The Court, in determining the particular sentence to be imposed,
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In Part V of its opinion, the Court applied its holding to the
cases before it.8" The Court affirmed the Seventh Circuit's decision
regarding Booker's case and remanded it to the district court for
sentencing consistent with this opinion.8 Fanfan's sentence was
vacated by the Court so that he could be re-sentenced under this
new system.8 2 In addition, the Court ordered that this holding be
applied to all cases on direct review.83 Justice Breyer emphasized
that not every appeal will result in a new sentencing hearing because not every sentence involves this Sixth Amendment issue."
The majority concluded its opinion by expressing its expectation
that reviewing courts will consider whether the Sixth Amendment
issue was previously raised and whether the existing sentence
fails the "plain-error" test."5
In his dissent to Justice Breyers' majority opinion, Justice Stevens argued that Justice Breyer's remedy involved performing a
legislative function that was beyond the Court's power.86 He emphasized that a statute is presumed valid and will only be invalidated when it is clear that Congress exceeded its constitutionally
appointed power by enacting it. 7 He noted two exceptions to this
practice. 8 First, a statute may be facially invalid if most or all of
its applications are unconstitutional. Second, if the statute contains an unconstitutional provision that cannot be severed, then it
will be considered invalid in its entirety.90 Justice Stevens argued
that these principles were not applicable here because most applications of the Sentencing Guidelines are constitutional and none
of its provisions were ruled unconstitutional.' He concluded that
it was beyond the Court's power to alter the Sentencing Guidelines because they could be applied, as written, in a manner conshall consider... (4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range established for (A) the
applicable category of offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set
forth in the guidelines.... " 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(4) (emphasis added).
80. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769. In Part IV of Justice Breyer's opinion, the majority included a discussion of other proposed remedies. Id. at 768.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769.
86. Id. at 771-72 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Souter joined in Justice Stevens'
dissent and Justice Scalia joined in part. Id. at 771.
87. Id. at 773.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 773. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 773-74.
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sistent with the Sixth Amendment.92 His dissent also included
extensive analysis of the reasoning used by the majority to support its interpretation of Congressional intent regarding the Sentencing Guidelines."
Justice Scalia wrote separately in dissent of Justice Breyer's
opinion in order to address the impact of the altered statute on the
appellate review process of federal sentencing.94 He began his
analysis of this issue by noting that the purpose of the severed
appellate review provision was to ensure judicial conformity to the
Sentencing Guidelines.95 Justice Scalia argued that since the Sentencing Guidelines are no longer mandatory, then the entire provision dealing with review should be eliminated, not altered.96 He
noted that the practice of limiting appellate review of discretionary sentencing to instances involving legal error in applying a prescribed statutory range continued under the Sentencing Guidelines.97 Justice Scalia wrote that the statutory range that district
court judges had to follow was the one established in the Sentencing Guidelines.9" This principle is not followed by the Court's rem92. Id. at 776. Justice Stevens wrote extensively in his dissent about the appropriate
application of severability principles. Id. He argued that they were not applicable in this
instance due to the facts of this case and established precedent. Id. at 777. In Part II of his
dissent, Justice Stevens addressed each of the five reasons that the majority gave for finding his alternative remedy inappropriate. Id. at 779-82. He began this discussion by attacking the majority's interpretation of the statutory language. Id. at 779. Noting that
Congress' use of the phrase "the court" indicated that Congress 'contemplated" judicial
fact-finding, he emphasized that it did not necessarily mean that Congress intended for
judges to be the exclusive fact-finder regarding sentencing factors. Id. (emphasis removed).
Regarding the majority's argument that sentencing based on real conduct would be more
difficult, Justice Stevens responded that he believes that the majority's remedy "may do
just as much damage to real conduct sentencing.... " Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 780-81 (Stevens,
J., dissenting). He also addressed the majority's argument that his remedy would result in
more complex sentencing procedures. Id. at 781. Justice Stevens stated that there would
be very few cases that would implicate the Sixth Amendment and that juries have had to
deal with complex facts in other areas of law. Id. He also rejected the majority's argument
regarding the negative impact of plea bargaining on uniform sentencing by emphasizing
that judges would still have the authority to reject plea agreements that did not reflect the
facts. Id. at 781-82. Finally, Justice Stevens countered Justice Breyer's argument regarding limiting the judge's ability to increase sentencing by stating that judges continue to
have the authority to increase a sentence as long as it is within the supported range of the
Sentencing Guidelines. Id. at 782.
93. Id. at 783. In Part III of his lengthy dissent, Justice Stevens discussed the history
of the Sentence Reform Act in order to interpret Congress' intent. Id.
94. Id. at 789. Justice Scalia joined Justice Stevens' dissent except for Part III and
n.17. Id.
95. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 791 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
96. Id.
97. Id. at 791-92.
98. Id. at 792.
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edy, Justice Scalia argued, because the Court stated that the
standard of review for all sentencing appeals will be "unreasonableness."99 He concluded his analysis by stating that an attempt
to apply this standard of review will likely result in either a great
variance in sentences or the preservation of the mandatory nature
of the Sentencing Guidelines. 0
Justice Thomas focused his dissent of Justice Breyer's opinion
on the appropriate application of the severability principles.'
Justice Thomas explained in Part II of his dissent that severability may apply to statutory applications as well as statutory proviHe addressed the question of whether the unconstitusions.
tional application of the Sentencing Guidelines to Booker was severable from its constitutional application to other defendants.'
Justice Thomas concluded that this unconstitutional application
was not severable because it is unclear as to whether Congress
would have passed the Sentencing Guidelines if they could not be
The remedy sugapplied as they were in Booker's sentencing.!
gested by Justice Thomas was to permit judges to apply the Sentencing Guidelines, as written, in a manner that does not violate
the Sixth Amendment.' 5 He concluded that this constitutional
protection could be preserved by either permitting juries to deter99. Id. Justice Scalia wrote that the unreasonableness standard has only been available in instances when the judge applied a sentence outside of the sentencing range. Id.
He also analyzed the appropriateness of judicially imposing the unreasonableness standard
of review to the statute after severing an explicitly stated standard of review. Id. at 793.
According to Justice Scalia, the Court's addition and recognition of an implied standard of
review to "fill a gap" demonstrated the Court's failure to properly apply severability principles. Id. He stated that the 'well established" standard regarding the application of severability is that "the unconstitutional part of a statute 'may be dropped if what is left is fully
operative as a law.'" Id. (quoting Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987))
(alteration in original). The Court's altering of the statute is an exercise of legislative
power that is beyond the Court's power to exercise. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 793. (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
100. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 794-95 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia hypothesized
several situations that would involve the use of the unreasonableness standard of review.
Id. He noted that the vagueness of the standard could result in the application of a variety
of standards which would result in "excessive sentencing disparities." Id. Justice Scalia
also argued that this standard may result in the continued mandatory application of the
Sentencing Guidelines because district court judges will not impose sentences outside its
range for fear of reversal on appeal. Id. at 795. He concluded his dissent by criticizing the
majority for not considering these issues. Id.
101. Id. at 795 (Thomas, J., dissenting). In Part I of his dissent, Justice Thomas discussed the constitutionality of the related sentencing provisions. Id. at 796-98.
102. Id. at 799.
103. Id. at 800-01.
104. Id. at 801.
105. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 802 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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mine, beyond a reasonable doubt, the facts that enhanced sentences beyond the statutory maximum or by limiting sentences to
those within the statutory range supported by the jury's verdict.' °6
The notice and jury requirements of the Sixth Amendment of
the United States Constitution ensure that the rights of criminal
defendants are protected against infringement by the government."7 In addition, the criminal defendant is also protected by
the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.0 8 A criminal defendant's right to have a jury determine
the truth of the charges against him has its origin in English
common law. °9 The notice doctrine of the Sixth Amendment preserves the common law practice that citizens must be made aware
of the potential consequences of their actions."' Despite the temptation to adopt a more convenient and efficient justice system in
our complex society by shifting more responsibility to sentencing
judges, the role of juries and judges must be balanced in order to
ensure that these protections are not eroded.''
In 1970, the Supreme Court addressed the application of due
process protections when it decided In re Winship."' The Court
considered whether the historical practice of proving a criminal
charge beyond a reasonable doubt 1 3 was constitutionally required
as part of a juvenile defendant's right to due process."' Justice
Brennan, writing for the majority, noted several reasons to support the recognition of this standard as a constitutional requirement for both juvenile and adult defendants." 5 He emphasized
106.

Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting).

107. See u.s. CONST. amend. VI.
108. See U.S. CONST. amend. V and u.s.

CONST.

amend. XIV.

109. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 343 (1769).
110. O.W. HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 40 (1881).
111. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 342-43 (1769).
112. 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
113. Reasonable doubt refers to "[t]he doubt that prevents one from being firmly convinced of a defendant's guilt, or the belief that there is a real possibility that a defendant is
not guilty." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1018 (Abridged 7th ed. 2000).
114. Winship, 397 U.S. at 359, 361. This case involved a proceeding in New York's Family Court to determine if the defendant should be deemed a delinquent because of his conduct. Id. at 358-59. The judge from New York's Family Court based his finding of delinquency on a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 360. He noted that the evidence presented might not be sufficient to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt if this were a
criminal proceeding. Id. As a result of his finding of delinquency, the judge ordered the
defendant to be placed in a training school for up to six years, possibly until his eighteenth
birthday. Id.
115. Id. at 362-63, 368. Justice Brennan noted that "[e]xpressions in many opinions of
this Court indicate that it has long been assumed that proof of a criminal charge beyond a
reasonable doubt is constitutionally required." Id. at 362.

Fall 2005

United States v. Booker

161

that this standard is key to decreasing the risk of conviction based
on factual error."' The majority also noted that it is vital to our
criminal system because of the liberty interests at stake in a
criminal proceeding. 1 7 The Court concluded that the government
bears the burden of proving every element of the charged crime
beyond a reasonable doubt in order to satisfy the due process requirements of the Constitution."'
When the Court decided McMillan v. Pennsylvania"9 in 1986, it
considered the constitutionality of Pennsylvania's Mandatory
Minimum Sentencing Act. 2 ° After analyzing the statutory language of the Act, the Court noted that the legislature explicitly
stated that visible possession of a firearm should not be considered
an element of the crimes enumerated within the Act.'2 ' Justice
Rehnquist emphasized that this sentencing factor only becomes
applicable after the defendant is found guilty beyond a reasonable
In
doubt of at least one of the specific crimes noted in the Act.'
addition, the Court espoused the notion that, while the legislature
has the power to define factors as sentencing considerations, its
power is subject to limitations.'23 The Court concluded that Penn116. Id. at 363.
117. Id. at 363-64. In addition to noting the importance of recognizing the liberty interests at stake in criminal proceedings, the Court also referred to the stigma associated with
a criminal conviction. Id. at 363.
118. Id. at 364. Although the issue presented in this case involved the application of
this standard to minors in juvenile proceedings, the Court emphasized that this is a standard that should be applied universally to adults and minors. Id. at 368.
119. 477 U.S. 79 (1986).
120. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 80. See 42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (1982) (current version at
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (2004)).
121. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 83. 42 PA CONS. STAT. § 9712 reads, in relevant part:
(a) Mandatory sentence. - [A]ny person who is convicted in any court of this
Commonwealth of a crime of violence as described in section 9714(g) .... shall,
if the person visibly possessed a firearm during the commission of the offense,
be sentenced to a minimum sentence of at least five years of total confinement
notwithstanding any other provision of this title or other statute to the contrary ....
(b) Proof at sentencing.-Provisions of this section shall not be an element of
the crime and notice thereof to the defendant shall not be required prior to conviction, but reasonable notice of the Commonwealth's intention to proceed under this section shall be provided after conviction and before sentencing.
Id. at 81 n.1 (quoting 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 9712(a) and 9712(b) (1982) (current version at
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 9712 (2004)).
122. McMillan, 477 U.S. at 85-86. Rehnquist opined that earlier cases have taught the
Court that it "should hesitate to conclude that due process bars the State from pursuing its
chosen course in the area of defining crimes and prescribing penalties." Id. at 86.
123. Id. at 86. Even though the Court recognized that States are subject to limitations
in the exercise of this power, it did not specifically define a set parameter for those limits.
Id. However, the majority did note that "in certain limited circumstances, Winship's rea-
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sylvania's legislature did not exceed its power by defining the visible possession of a firearm as a sentencing factor. 2 4 Therefore, the
defendant's Sixth Amendment and due process rights were not
violated when the sentencing judge found
by a preponderance of
25
fact.
this
of
existence
the
the evidence
The Court further clarified the scope of the jury's role in criminal cases in 1995 when it decided United States v. Gaudin.' The
issue in Gaudin was whether the element of materiality was a
legal question to be determined by the judge or a question of
mixed law and fact to be determined beyond a reasonable doubt by
a jury."' The Court held that a criminal defendant has the constitutional right to have a jury find him guilty of all elements of a
charged
criminal offense, including questions of mixed law and
128
fact.
Whether an element of a criminal offense that must be determined by a jury should be distinguished from a sentencing factor
that is determined by a judge was an issue presented to the Court
in 1998 in Almendarez-Torres v. United States.'2 9 Relying on the
Court's holding in McMillan, the defendant argued that using recidivism 3 ° to authorize an increased maximum sentence exceeded
the constitutional limits of Congress' power to define sentencing

sonable doubt requirement applies to facts not formally identified as elements of the offense
charged." Id.
124. Id. at 86-87. The majority based its decision on several factors. Id. First, this Act
creates no presumption of fact or guilt. Id. at 87. Second, it does not relieve the prosecution of its burden of proving guilt beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime charged. Id.
Finally, because the Act does not alter the maximum penalty nor does it create a separate
offense that calls for a separate sentence, it has the sole purpose of limiting the sentencing
judge's discretion in choosing a sentence within the range already available. Id. at 87-88.
125. Id. at 93.
126. 515 U.S. 506 (1995). This case involved a series of real estate transactions that
were financed by loans insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA). Gaudin,
515 U.S. at 507-08. Gaudin was charged with multiple counts of making false statements
on federal loan documents. Id. at 508.
127. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 509. The Court noted that in order to be deemed material
"[tihe statement must have 'a natural tendency to influence, or [be] capable of influencing,
the decision of the decisionmaking body to which it was addressed.'" Id. (quoting Kungys v.
United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988)). A question of mixed law and fact refers to "[an
issue that is neither a pure question of fact nor a pure question of law." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 815 (Abridged 7th ed. 2000).
128. Gaudin, 515 U.S. at 511.
129. 523 U.S. 224, 228 (1998). Almendarez-Torres pleaded guilty to violating 8 U.S.C. §
1326. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 227. Before his plea was accepted by the district
court, he admitted that he had unlawfully reentered the United States after being previously deported as a result of three earlier "convictions" for aggravated felonies. Id.
130. Recidivism is an individual's "tendency to relapse into a habit of criminal activity or
behavior." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1021 (Abridged 7th ed. 2000).
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factors.131 The Court held that Congress did not exceed the limit
suggested in McMillan because recidivism has traditionally been
treated as a sentencing factor used to increase a defendant's sentence.132 Therefore, the Court concluded that a criminal defendant's prior conviction is not an element of an offense that must be
proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.'
In 1999, the Court addressed this issue again when it decided
Jones v. United States.' This case involved the interpretation of
provisions within the federal carjacking statute. 135 In order to
make this determination, the Court relied on a long-standing rule
of statutory interpretation.'36 Under this rule, the Court was obligated to resolve any interpretive uncertainties so that constitutional violations were avoided. 37 Justice Souter, writing for the
majority, stated that, while the federal carjacking statute 138 at first
131. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 242. 8 U.S.C. § 1326 reads, in relevant part:
(a) Subject to subsection (b) of this section, any alien who - (1) has been ... deported..., and thereafter (2) enters ... , or is at any time found in, the United
States ... shall be fined under title 18, or imprisoned not more than 2 years,
or both. - (b) Notwithstanding subsection (a) of this section, in the case of any
alien described in such subsection... - (2) whose deportation was subsequent
to a conviction for commission of an aggravated felony, such alien shall be fined
under such title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 229 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1326 (1988) (current version at 8
U.S.C. § 1326 (2000)). Almendarez-Torres argued that subsection (b) is an element of the
crime that was not charged so he could not be sentenced to more than 2 years, as specified
under subsection (a). Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 227.
132. Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at 243. The majority stated, "Congress, reflecting this
tradition, has never, to our knowledge, made a defendant's recidivism an element of an
offense where the conduct proscribed is otherwise unlawful." Id. at 244. Recognizing that
this tradition does not necessarily "foreclose petitioner's claim," the Court held that the
Constitution does not require that recidivism be deemed an element of a crime. Id.
133. Id. at 247.
134. 526 U.S. 227 (1999). During a robbery involving Jones and two accomplices, one of
the victims was seriously injured when struck in his left ear with a gun. Jones, 526 U.S. at
229. After his accomplices fled the scene, Jones stole the victim's car in order to pursue
them. Id. Although Jones was indicted for violation of the federal carjacking statute, his
indictment made no mention of the statute's numbered subsections. Id. at 230. In addition, he was not charged with the facts contained within the other provisions. Id. The
judge at Jones' arraignment informed him that the maximum sentence he could receive for
the carjacking charge was fifteen years. Id. at 230-31. However, he was sentenced twentyfive years, as recommended by the pre-sentence report, because of the injury to the victim.
Jones, 526 U.S. at 231.
135. Jones, 526 U.S. at 229. See 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1988 & Supp. V) (current version at
18 U.S.C. § 2119 (2000)).
136. Jones, 526 U.S. at 228.
137. Id. at 229.
138. 18 U.S.C. § 2119 reads, in relevant part:
Whoever, possessing a firearm as defined in section 921 of this title, takes a
motor vehicle . . . from the person or in the presence of another by force and
violence or by intimidation .

. .,

shall -

(1) be fined under this title or impris-
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glance appears to include a main paragraph defining the offense
followed by subsections that define sentencing provisions, the is3 9 Specifically, the Court emphasue required further scrutiny."
sized that the subsections relating to bodily injury result in significantly higher penalties that require the finding of additional
facts. ° In addition to considering the language of the statute, the
Court also reviewed the traditional treatment of bodily injury as a
criminal element in other federal statutes.14 ' The Court concluded
that serious bodily injury was intended by Congress to be an element of an aggravated form of carjacking subject to a more serious
penalty.'
Acknowledging that the statute could also be interpreted to contain sentencing provisions, the Court reviewed a series of cases
that addressed similar constitutional issues.'
Justice Souter
raised the argument in a footnote that any fact that increases the
maximum penalty for a crime must be submitted to a jury for determination beyond a reasonable doubt.'
The Court concluded
that the carjacking statute had the effect of establishing three
separate offenses with elements associated with varying degrees
of bodily injury.14 ' The Court held that in order to prevent a constitutional violation of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments, those

oned not more than 15 years, or both, (2) if serious bodily injury... results, be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both, and (3) if
death results, be fined under this title or imprisoned for any number of years
up to life, or both.
Jones, 526 U.S. at 230 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1988 & Supp. V) (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 2119 (2000)).
139. Jones, 526 U.S. at 232.
140. Id. at 233. Because these facts are as important as the elements within the first
paragraph of the statute, the Court found it "questionable whether the specification of facts
sufficient to increase a penalty range by two-thirds ... were meant to carry none of the
process safeguards that elements of an offense bring with them for a defendant's benefit."
Id.
141. Id. at 234. Examining the historical treatment of a particular fact or type of fact
was previously used by the Court to determine if recidivism should be considered an element of a crime or a sentencing provision. Id. at 235 (citing Almendarez-Torres, 523 U.S. at
230). In Jones, the majority considered the robbery statutes that "served as a model for §
2119." Jones, 526 U.S. at 234.
142. Jones, 526 U.S. at 236. The Court also relied on the practices of the States regarding bodily injury to support this conclusion. Id. at 236-37. Justice Souter addressed the
Government's argument that legislative history does not support the majority's interpretation of the statute. Id. at 237-38. He emphasized that the legislative history is not conclusive because it also provides support for the majority's interpretation. Id. at 238-39.
143. Id. at 239.
144. Jones, 526 U.S. at 243 n.6.
145. Id. at 252.
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presented to the jury, and proven beelements must be charged,
14
yond a reasonable doubt. 1
In Apprendi v. New Jersey,"7 the Supreme Court considered
whether a factual determination that increases a defined maximum sentence for an offense from ten years to twenty years must
be made by a jury, rather than a sentencing judge. 4 ' Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, emphasized that merely applying
the label of sentencing factor does not excuse a fact from being
subjected to the same due process safeguards as elements of a
crime. 149 The Court noted that if a fact results in the deprivation
of liberty beyond that anticipated by the crime charged, then it is
subject to the constitutional safeguards required by the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments.150
While the Court acknowledged that it is within the sentencing
judge's discretion to consider other facts when determining an appropriate sentence, his discretion is limited to the statutory range
for the sentence prescribed for that offense.' 5 ' However, the Court
noted, it is not constitutionally permissible for the legislature to
remove from the jury the determination of facts that increase the
maximum sentence of an offense by labeling them as sentencing
factors."' As a result of its analysis of previous cases in this area
and the relevant history, the Court confirmed its opinion first expressed in Jones."' The Court mandated that other than a prior
conviction, any fact that raises the sentence for an offense beyond
the defined statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt."
Prior to Ring v. Arizona,"' the Supreme Court held in Walton v.
Arizona"' that it was not a violation of the Sixth Amendment for
146. Id.
147. 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
148. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 469. After entering into a plea agreement, Apprendi's sentence was increased under New Jersey's hate crime statute based on the preponderance of
the evidence found by the sentencing judge. Id. at 470-7 1. Even though it affirmed the
lower courts' decision, a divided New Jersey Supreme Court noted that "the mere fact that
a state legislature has placed a criminal component 'within the sentencing provisions' of the
criminal code 'does not mean that the finding of a biased purpose to intimidate is not an
essential element of the offense.'" Id. at 472.
149. Id. at 476.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 481.
152. Id. at 482-83.
153. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
154. Id.
155. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
156. 497 U.S. 639 (1990), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
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sentencing judges to make determinations regarding aggravating
factors in capital cases."' This conclusion was supported by the
Court's finding that these aggravating factors qualified as sentencing considerations and not elements of capital murder.'58 The
issue presented to the Court in Ring involved whether the Sixth
Amendment's guarantee to a jury trial required that the jury determine the presence of aggravating factors that could result in
the imposition of the death penalty.9 Applying the rationale from
Apprendi that a defendant is entitled to constitutional protections
before he is subjected to a sentence beyond the maximum supported by the jury verdict, the Court determined that a defendant
in a capital murder case is entitled to the same level of protection
before he is subjected to the death penalty.'
As a result, the
Court concluded that its decision in Walton was not consistent
with its decision in Apprendi and must be overruled.' Therefore,
the Court held that the Sixth Amendment requires that aggravating factors used to determine the imposition of the death penalty
must be decided by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt. 6'
In a case decided in 2004, Blakely v. Washington, 3 the Supreme
Court considered the constitutionality of Washington's sentencing
statute.
Washington's Sentencing Reform Act gave judges the
authority to impose sentences on criminal defendants beyond the
standard range in certain circumstances.'6 5 In an effort to justify

157. Ring, 536 U.S. at 588 (citing Walton, 497 U.S. at 649). When provided with instructions regarding premeditated murder and felony murder, the jury found Ring guilty of
felony murder that happened during the commission of armed robbery. Ring, 536 U.S. at
591. The Arizona Supreme Court noted that while there was sufficient evidence to support
Ring's connection to the proceeds of the armed robbery, there was not sufficient evidence
admitted at Ring's trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he "was a major participant in the armed robbery or that he actually murdered Magoch." Id.
158. Ring, 536 U.S. at 591.
159. Id. at 597. Under Arizona law, the maximum sentence that Ring could receive for
felony murder was life imprisonment "unless at least one aggravating factor is found to
exist beyond a reasonable doubt." Id.
160. Id. at 609.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 609.
163. 542 U.S. 296 (2004).
164. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 301. As a result of a plea agreement, Blakely entered a guilty
plea for second-degree kidnapping involving domestic violence and firearm allegations. Id.
at 299. While he admitted to the elements of this offense, he admitted no other facts. Id.
According to Washington's sentencing statute, the "standard range" of sentencing available
for Blakely's punishment was 49 to 53 months. Id. This was the sentence recommended by
the State pursuant to the plea agreement. Id. at 300.
165. Id. The sentencing judge imposed an "exceptional" sentence of 90 months after
hearing the testimony of Blakely's ex-wife at the sentencing proceeding. Id. The judge
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the judge's imposition of the enhanced sentence, the State based
its argument on a broad definition of statutory maximum. 166 The
Court settled that issue by declaring that the statutory maximum
for Apprendi purposes refers to the maximum sentence that can be
imposed by the judge based on the facts found by the jury or admitted by the defendant.16 7 Because the judge based Blakely's exceptional sentence on additional facts that were not determined by
a jury or admitted by Blakely, the sentence was held invalid. 66
Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, emphasized that the
Court did not find determinative sentencing guidelines unconstitutional.'69 He stated that the Court determined that the procedures used for implementing Washington's determinative sentencing guidelines did not satisfy the requirements of the Sixth
Amendment. 7 ° In response to the arguments raised in the dissenting opinions, Justice Scalia emphasized that the Sixth
Amendment does not limit judicial power, but serves to reserve
the power of the jury. 7 '
The majority's holding in United States v. Booker regarding the
implication of the Sixth Amendment is consistent with the jurisprudence established in Apprendi and its progeny. This decision
also reflects the necessity of preserving the due process and jury
rights guaranteed by the Constitution in a criminal system that
continues to place additional significance and emphasis on sentencing factors. Trial by jury is not a procedural formality, but a
substantive right that guarantees criminal defendants fair and
just trials and sentences.'72

concluded that Blakely acted with "deliberate cruelty," which was "a statutorily enumerated ground for departure [from the standard range] in domestic violence cases." Id.
166. Id. at 303. The State argued that Apprendi principles were not violated because
Blakely was convicted of a class B felony, which had a maximum sentence of ten years. Id.
Therefore, the judge's imposition of the 90 month sentence, which exceeded the standard
sentencing range, did not exceed the statutory maximum. Id.
167. Id. The majority stated, "In other words, the relevant 'statutory maximum' is not
the maximum sentence a judge may impose after finding additional facts, but the maximum he may impose without any additional findings." Id. at 303-04.
168. Id. at 305. In Part III of his opinion, Justice Scalia espoused that "[olur commitment to Apprendi in this context reflects ... the need to give intelligible content to the right
of jury trial." Id. He emphasized "that right [to a jury trial] is no mere procedural formality, but a fundamental reservation of power in our constitutional structure." Id. at 305-06.
169. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 308. A determinative sentence is "[a] sentence for a fixed
length of time rather than for an unspecified duration." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1097
(Abridged 7th ed. 2000).
170. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 308.
171. Id. at 308-09.
172. Booker v. United States, 125 S. Ct. 738, 752 (2005).
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As sentencing procedures have evolved, the Court has sought to
strike a balance between the goals of the sentencing reformers and
the criminal defendant's constitutionally guaranteed rights. Traditionally, sentencing of criminal defendants involved indeterminate sentencing where Congress defined the sentencing range for
a criminal offense and judges exercised broad discretion in determining the scope of the sentence within that range. 7 ' Judges had
the authority to consider various factors in order to determine if a
longer sentence was appropriate. The desire for increased uniformity of sentencing led to the Sentence Reform Act of 1984, the
creation of the Sentencing Commission, the development of the
Sentencing Guidelines, and a shift to determinative sentencing for
federal crimes.174 As a result of the application of the Sentencing
Guidelines to impose enhanced sentences and other sentence enhancement statutes at the state and federal level, there has been a
shift in power from the jury to the judge.'
Juries continue to consider and determine guilt as defined by
the elements of the criminal offense charged, but have less impact
on determining the sentence to be imposed. As the legislature
continued to increase the emphasis on facts that enhanced sentencing ranges, the burden shifted to judges to determine the upper limits of sentences. This burden involved judges engaging in
judicial fact-finding by a preponderance of the evidence. Recognizing the liberty interests at stake by this shift of power and the increased magnitude of the enhancements, the Court sought to ensure that constitutional safeguards were reserved to protect
criminal defendants.'76 These constitutional safeguards were in
the form of the due process rights of trial by jury.
In Apprendi, the Court espoused that the mere label of sentencing factor does not make a fact immune from due process safeguards, especially if a sentencing factor results in the deprivation
of liberty beyond that anticipated by the defendant based on the
crime charged. 7 The Court held that, other than a prior conviction, any fact that raises the sentence for an offense beyond the
defined statutory maximum must be submitted to a jury and
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.'
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 363 (1989).
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 366-67.
Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 751-52.
Id. at 752.
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 476 (2000).
Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
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In Blakely, the majority defined statutory maximum as the
maximum sentence a judge may impose on the basis of the facts
found by the jury beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted by the
defendant. 9 Further defining the jury's role under the Sentencing Guidelines was naturally the next step for the Court because
of the similarity between Washington's sentencing guidelines and
the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. Therefore, these principles
were correctly applied by the Court in Booker.
Booker and Fanfan were both convicted by juries of federal
crimes which made their sentences subject to the Sentencing
Guidelines. At the sentencing proceedings, the judges considered
additional facts to best determine the appropriate sentences to
impose on the defendants. Based on the judges' findings by a preponderance of the evidence of increased quantities of drugs and
other factors, the judges were required to impose enhanced sentences. These enhanced sentences significantly increased the
length of imprisonment over the sentences that were supported by
the jury verdict and anticipated by the defendants. Based on the
Sentencing Guidelines, their enhanced sentences represented an
increase of at least nine and thirteen years, respectively. 80 If imposed, these enhanced sentences would result in a significant deprivation of liberty that should be subject to constitutional safeguards. This is the type of sentencing that the Court sought to
prevent in Apprendi and its progeny. The Court supports the goal
of uniform sentencing based on the character and conduct of the
defendant, but not at the expense of an individual's constitutional
rights.
Justice Stevens' attempt to preserve the jury's role under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines was short-lived as a result of the
remedy applied by Justice Breyer and his supporters. Determining that Congress would not have established or supported a system that required jury determination of sentencing factors, Justice
Breyer's majority concluded that the Sentencing Guidelines had to
be advisory.'
It is interesting that Justice Breyer chose to apply
such a sweeping remedy when Justice Stevens and his supporters
only held that a particularapplication of the Sentencing Guide-
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170

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 44

lines was unconstitutional.18 In addition, Justices Stevens, Scalia,
Souter, and Thomas argued that the Sixth Amendment require183
ments could be applied to the Sentencing Guidelines as written.
Booker represents the continuing battle between the justices
who support judicial fact-finding in sentencing and the justices
who are committed to preserving the constitutional safeguards
available to criminal defendants."s It is unlikely that this battle is
over, as the appeals courts will determine what happens next. By
ordering that the Court's holding must be applied to all cases on
direct review, the Court left it to the federal appellate courts to
determine which cases will be remanded for new sentencing hearings.
In determining which cases should be remanded, the appeals
Inconsistencies recourts are to use the plain error standard.'
in several of the
have
occurred
garding how to apply this standard
appeals courts. The Third Circuit has decided that all cases
"anywhere in the appellate pipeline" when Booker was decided
shall be remanded back to the district court regardless of whether
the defendant raised a Sixth Amendment claim in his initial appeal." The Eleventh Circuit declared that it will not adopt the
Third Circuit's broad standard and will only consider appeals that
were filed prior to Booker if a Sixth Amendment challenge was
raised in the initial brief.'87 The defendants from the Eleventh
Circuit and any other circuit that adopts a similar narrow interpretation will most likely appeal this decision to the Supreme
Court. In order to ensure that a uniform standard is being applied
182. Id. at 756 (holding that the Sixth Amendment was only violated when the Sentencing Guidelines required judges to increase criminal defendants' sentences beyond the
maximum sentence supported by a jury's verdict).
183. Id. at 771 (Stevens, J., dissenting), 789 (Scalia, J., dissenting), 795 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
184. Until Justice Ginsburg switched her affiliation regarding the remedy to be applied
in Booker, the Court consistently split 5-4 in cases of this type. See Blakely v. Washington
542 U.S. 296 (2004); Ring v. Arizona 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Apprendi v. United States, 530
U.S. 466 (2000); Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227 (1999); and Almendarez-Torres, 523
U.S. 224 (1998).
185. Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769.
186. Duffy, Shannon P., 3' CircuitSays Resentencing Required in 'Post-Booker'Appeals,
THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (May 2, 2005) availableat
http://www.law.coffljsp/ardcle.jsp?id=l 114798473089. See United States v. Davis, 407 F.3d 162
(3d Cir. 2005).
187. Jones, Carl, 11th Circuit Still Cool to 'Booker', DAILY BuSINESS REVIEW (July 19,
2005) available at http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=l121721617254. See United States v.
Raphael Levy, 416 F.3d 1273 (11th Cir. 2005).
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throughout the circuit courts, the Supreme Court will need to address this issue by once again revisiting Booker's remedy and its
application.
Additional struggles lay ahead for the appellate courts as they
attempt to apply the "unreasonableness" standard of review mandated by Booker to future decisions under the advisory Sentencing
Guidelines. As a result, it is highly likely that this Sixth Amendment issue will present itself again before the Supreme Court for
further clarification.
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